On the question of whether the optimal bet size with A9 is all in if all limpers are capped to hands with <50% equity (ignoring the bb for the moment)… If there are no further streets to be played, it is clear the equilibrium bet size is all in; consider the limpers as a single opponent which can only call with one hand, then noting that the definition of a pair of co optimal strategies is one for which neither player can unilaterally improve their ev. Since for any calling frequency of the villain, raising all in will generate the most ev, we have to raise all in. Put anther way, if villain and us identify a pair of strategies we claim are optimal, which doesn't involve me shoving, then unless villains call frequency is zero I can improve my ev vs villain strategy by jamming and therefore the original strategies were not cooptimal. If the optimal strategy villain arrives at is always fold then all bet sizes generate the same ev.
In a real world multistreet game I suspect that vs a small number of opponents in position we prefer to raise small (think AKQ multi street game, player with advantage prefers to break betting up over multiple streets, however may not hold as equities are highly non static across the flop), and vs many opponents oop we prefer jam as we will not be able to effectively leverage over later streets, and while when called by one opponent we are always ahead, against two opponents we do not have to be a favorite.
I think this statement:…
‘Since for any calling frequency of the villain, raising all in will generate the most ev, we have to raise all in’
…is assuming opponents’ calling frequencies are independent of bet sizing. If the opponent would fold to an all-in bet but call a 2/3rds pot-sized bet then all-in would not be optimal.
On the question of whether the optimal bet size with A9 is all in if all limpers are capped to hands with <50% equity (ignoring the bb for the moment)… If there are no further streets to be played, it is clear the equilibrium bet size is all in; consider the limpers as a single opponent which can only call with one hand, then noting that the definition of a pair of co optimal strategies is one for which neither player can unilaterally improve their ev. Since for any calling frequency of the villain, raising all in will generate the most ev, we have to raise all in. Put anther way, if villain and us identify a pair of strategies we claim are optimal, which doesn't involve me shoving, then unless villains call frequency is zero I can improve my ev vs villain strategy by jamming and therefore the original strategies were not cooptimal. If the optimal strategy villain arrives at is always fold then all bet sizes generate the same ev.
In a real world multistreet game I suspect that vs a small number of opponents in position we prefer to raise small (think AKQ multi street game, player with advantage prefers to break betting up over multiple streets, however may not hold as equities are highly non static across the flop), and vs many opponents oop we prefer jam as we will not be able to effectively leverage over later streets, and while when called by one opponent we are always ahead, against two opponents we do not have to be a favorite.
I think this statement:…
‘Since for any calling frequency of the villain, raising all in will generate the most ev, we have to raise all in’
…is assuming opponents’ calling frequencies are independent of bet sizing. If the opponent would fold to an all-in bet but call a 2/3rds pot-sized bet then all-in would not be optimal.