Thanks to everyone who contributed to the Hand of the Week so far.
The comments from the pre-flop discussion that I found most interesting were from dullgeek and others who struggled with the problem of how to put money in good once there’s an Ace or King on the board. This is a central dilemma in poker: how do you get paid off when your hand is strong but somewhat obvious (that is, it’s easy to see that there’s an Ace on the flop, and anybody without one will be reluctant to put money in). Of course the same problem occurs when there’s a pair on the board, when you river a flush, etc.
I can think of three answers to this dilemma:
1. Cooler your opponent. If Villain holds KQ or KJ here, we should have no trouble getting the money in. I’m tempted to say there’s no real skill involved here, but that’s not entirely true. If you fail to recognize the strength of your hand and give Villain a chance to put his stack in when he’s coolered, then you’ve made a big mistake. For instance, if Hero checks back the turn and does not shove over a bet on most blank rivers, then you aren’t making the most of a spot where you’re on the right side of a cooler. For the most part, though, coolers are like bad beats: you’ll be on both sides of them over time, and they don’t add or subtract from your theoretical bottom line.
2. Opponent makes a bad call. Plenty of them do. Again the skill is simply in giving them the chance to put the money in. Whether they actually pay you off is beyond your control, but there is also a skill in expanding your value range against these opponents and taking maximum advantage of their errors. In this case we don’t have any read about Villain’s payoff tendencies.
3. Play big pots with a balanced range. This has the potential to pay off in two ways. Many opponents – even, perhaps especially, skilled ones – know or have learned that most people don’t bluff enough in certain spots. If you exhibit this same tendency, even opponents who don’t know you may correctly guess this and make tight folds that successfully exploit you. Correcting your bluffing frequency won’t necessarily help you win more from your big hands, but it will enable you to profit from your opponent’s tight folds without exposing yourself to risk of exploitation. If you’re known or suspected to be capable of playing better than the average bear, then your bluffs may actually be less profitable in this spot (though not money-losing, if you’re balanced) but you’ll win more with your strong hands, again provided that you’re willing to bet them.
That third point is an important one: except in spots where Hero is at a significant range disadvantage, his ability to value bet is limited only by his ability to find hands he’d like to bluff with. Many commenters’ assumption seems to be that because Hero will almost always have a pair on this turn (AK and KQ with a backdoor flush draw being among his weakest flop calls), he therefore can’t have many bluffs and can’t expect to get stacks in with AK.
Realize what you’re saying here, though: AK is extremely close to the top of Hero’s range, so if you aren’t playing this for stacks, you must assume that your opponent will very rarely be willing to put stacks in any hand in his range. With that much fold equity, turning your weakest pairs into bluffs starts to seem appealing. How much showdown value does 77 really have here, especially considering that it can still get bluffed out on the river if you check the turn?
I contend that Hero actually has quite a few hands that would like to bet the turn. The weakest, like 77, have near-zero showdown value. Stronger pairs still have something to gain from protection and may even be able to value bet. Is QQ really going to be behind if a half-pot bet goes in on the turn? And of course the strongest, certainly including AK, want to build a pot and set up a river shove.
Exploitively, if Villain’s range consists only of check-calls and check-folds, Hero may well do best by betting his full range for a small amount. Of course so much betting would give Villain incentive to check-raise both for value and as a bluff, and the equilibrium strategy likely entails a mix of betting and checking. Considering what an important hand AK is for Hero’s range and how static the board is, he’s probably indifferent between betting and checking at equilibrium, checking disproportionately often when he holds at least one heart.
Results
PokerStars – $665+$35|350/700 Ante 85 NL – Holdem – 9 players
Hand converted by PokerTracker 4: http://www.pokertracker.com
BB: 32.41 BB (VPIP: 21.28, PFR: 17.39, 3Bet Preflop: 15.79, Hands: 47)
UTG: 63.83 BB (VPIP: 25.09, PFR: 14.14, 3Bet Preflop: 5.60, Hands: 292)
UTG+1: 22.54 BB (VPIP: 19.23, PFR: 14.56, 3Bet Preflop: 14.29, Hands: 104)
MP: 56.87 BB (VPIP: 25.45, PFR: 22.22, 3Bet Preflop: 13.33, Hands: 56)
MP+1: 26.86 BB (VPIP: 19.21, PFR: 14.29, 3Bet Preflop: 5.26, Hands: 152)
MP+2: 82.3 BB (VPIP: 17.82, PFR: 14.14, 3Bet Preflop: 4.44, Hands: 101)
CO: 25.66 BB (VPIP: 21.43, PFR: 16.06, 3Bet Preflop: 13.33, Hands: 196)
Hero (BTN): 38.02 BB
SB: 25.48 BB (VPIP: 35.58, PFR: 28.62, 3Bet Preflop: 12.80, Hands: 348)
9 players post ante of 0.12 BB, SB posts SB 0.5 BB, BB posts BB 1 BB
Pre Flop: (pot: 2.59 BB) Hero has Kd Ah
UTG raises to 2 BB, fold, fold, fold, fold, fold, Hero calls 2 BB, fold, fold
Flop : (6.59 BB, 2 players) 5c 4s 5h
UTG bets 3 BB, Hero calls 3 BB
Turn : (12.59 BB, 2 players) Kh
UTG checks, Hero bets 6.3 BB, UTG calls 6.3 BB
River : (25.18 BB, 2 players) 6h
UTG checks, Hero bets 26.6 BB and is all-in, UTG calls 26.6 BB
Hero shows Kd Ah (Two Pair, Kings and Fives)
(Pre 44%, Flop 26%, Turn 95%)
UTG shows Td Th (Two Pair, Tens and Fives)
(Pre 56%, Flop 74%, Turn 5%)
Hero wins 78.38 BB
This river is not quite a blank, but because the important decision about just how big of a pot to try to play is made on the turn, I didn’t think it was worth having a separate discussion about whether to shove the river. If you aren’t going to shove, you might as well check the turn.
This board is static enough that betting the geometric growth of the pot (in other words, the same fraction of the pot on the turn and river) may well be the equilibrium strategy. However, I decided that what I really wanted to do here was bet my full range on the turn, on the assumption that Villain has a more-or-less pure bluff-catching range after his turn check, and then check back the river with hands like JJ or TT that bet for protection/thin value on the turn. Thus, my river range will be much more polarized and therefore make a larger bet than my turn range.
I don’t know what exactly to say about Villain’s call. It’s the sort of hand that should be indifferent at equilibrium. It’s possible that he flipped a coin before calling, and it’s possible that he would have called me with his entire turn range. Against the latter sort of player, you cost yourself a lot by not getting stacks in here.
Either way, the lesson is that you have to give your opponent a chance to pay you off when you have the top of your range. Before you decide that you can’t play for stacks, consider the implications of that assumption for your bluffing strategy. Many players end up missing profitable bluffs because they never ask, “What should my bluffing range look like here?” This mistake can also cause you to miss profitable value bets.
I really hate villian’s river call. And I’m skeptical of the turn call. There’s just so many ways he’s beat. If he thinks your capable of having a worse hand than TT, then he’s got to think your range could contain a 5, a K or a flush. I guess he put you on a bluff and went with it.
There’s more to poker than just counting up ways you could be beat. Also, I don’t see why it follows that if I could have a bluff, I could have a 5.
I don’t think that I’m just counting how you can be beat. I think I’m looking at your play and putting you on a range that has TT beat.
It’s hard for me to know exactly how I’d read you if I were villain and didn’t have knowledge of the results. But with TT, a button call with suited connectors (including 65ss) seems common enough to put into your range. I’ve noticed that a lot of tough players will frequently auto-float a c-bet, because a lot of weaker players are unwilling to double c-bet. And the stronger players then take the initiative on the turn. Which is what you actually did (leaving a river bluff in your range). After calling pre and calling the flop, connected hearts still has to be in your range.
Had you raised pre, I would discount most suited connectors from your range (except AKss). Had you called pre and raised the flop 65ss is looking stronger. But call, call, bet looks to me like: either the Kh helped you, or you’re bluffing. I would look at that card and maybe fold. But I think I would definitely fold the river.
But like I said, I’m looking at this with the benefit of knowing the results. I can’t be certain this is how I’d play you in game.
On the other hand, perhaps this is a leak on my part. Maybe I should be calling that river more often because I’m mis-reading my opponents’ ranges, and I’m losing value.
Sorry, I guess I came across as kind of dickish before. Let’s call it tough love. What I mean is that if you look at your original comment, you list hands that V loses to but you don’t consider how plausible they are based on the prior action, and you also don’t make any mention of what hands specifically Hero might bluff with or how many of them he could hold. You say here, “either the Kh helped you, or you’re bluffing” – well, yes, of course, but that doesn’t mean V should just fold all of his bluff-catchers. You have to look at how likely each of those things is, what kind of odds V is getting, etc. If you look back at some of my original posts, you’ll find my explanation for which hands Hero can bluff with here and why.
FWIW I don’t think Hero should have any 5x in his pre-flop range, stacks are way too shallow to flat something like 65s against an UTG raise. I realize some weak players and even some overconfident good players will do it, but I don’t think it’s a good call.
None of that is to say I think V’s call down is particularly good, just that I don’t think you’re analyzing the spot in the right way.
Last thing – I think you’re being paranoid about the “auto-float” thing. How is this something you could observe? At best you are going to see a few instances of a particular player calling a c-bet, and in many cases those aren’t going to go to showdown. I don’t see how you can have enough evidence to make such a broad claim, that “tough players” are just calling c-bets 100%. I do think, though, that many people psych themselves out and become convinced that tough players are playing back at them way more than they are.
Sorry again for the tone of the first comment (and maybe for the tone of this one as well, if applicable 😉 )
I didn’t think either the first comment or this one was “dickish”. Frankly, I’m grateful for the free coaching. I don’t know how to get away from the analysis that I’ve made but I recognize that you think there’s an error in there. I don’t yet see it but I think you’ve given me enough free hints that I have plenty to think about.