What’s Your Play? Top Pair Facing River Bomb Results

Thanks to everyone who commented on this week’s What’s Your Play? Here’s a sample:

Ruud says, “Generally I find Villain has the goods when he bombs the river like this.”

Pepito agrees, “unless he contemptuously views you as a bad, nitty player, what adept villain expects Kx to fold given that particular run out and action? river looks like soul-owning thin value from AK and/or KQ, or fat value from 2P, straights, and flushes.”

Mike argues exactly the opposite: “if he’s a good player, he will know he can try to rep something strong considering both a flush draw and straight draw got there.”

I think this is as telling a demonstration as you’re going to get of the value of guessing at the meaning of Villain’s bet. A “good player” shouldn’t be so easy to pigeonhole as definitely bluffing or definitely value betting, just as he shouldn’t feel confident about whether or not I’m going to call a river bet, so let’s dig a little deeper.

The Knowns (or Strongly Suspecteds)

1. Villain is raising exploitably many hands pre-flop and consequently will see the flop with an overly wide range. That means he’ll see the flop with a lot of weak hands. As long as we don’t fold exploitably often, he can’t show a profit by bluffing with them, so one way or the other our strongest hands will win the pot on any given run out – either Villain gives up frequently and lets us win at showdown, which also benefits some of our more medium-strength hands that aren’t going to call multiple barrels, or he bluffs frequently, meaning that we win the pot less often when we have the best hand but win larger pots with our bluff-catching range.

2. This is a particularly bad river for our hand and a good one for many of the draws Villain could have.

The Unknowns

1. Villain’s value betting strategy. Would he bet AK or AA for value here? If so, would he use this sizing? Multiple bet sizes, particularly on the river, is not necessarily an exploitable strategy, so let’s not rule out the possibility that this bet is more polarized than a $250 would be, but less polarized than a shove would be.

2. Villain’s turn barreling strategy. Does he bluff only/primarily draws? Because his range is more polarized than mine, he has room to make a larger bet with a range that includes more bluffs, and I think his sizing is likely a mistake on the turn, one that forces him either to give up with a lot of his weak hands or offer me appealing odds to call against a bluff-heavy range.

3. Villain’s river bluffing strategy. There are three options here: (a) He does his best to bet in a balanced way, though the number of bluffs available to him may be limited because of his turn sizing and the exact river card that came; (b) He bluffs too much, which requires him to also have bluffed too much on the turn; (c) A large bet means he is weighted towards value hands, which is a common tendency among non-elite players.

Against strategy (c), we do best by folding. Against (b), we’d prefer to call, and against (a) we’re either close to indifferent or prefer folding, depending on whether his turn bluffing strategy enables him to bluff the river adequately. The fact that we prefer folding in a lot of these hypotheticals does seem to argue for a fold, as does the fact that calling against (b) is probably less good than calling against (c) is bad, because (c) contains few if any bluffs, whereas (b) contains all value hands in addition to a lot of bluffs.

There’s another factor to consider, though. Given that Villain bet the turn and river, it’s somewhat more likely that he is playing overly bluffy strategy (b). In other words, because strategy (b) bets more often than the other strategies do (it’s easier to have air than a strong hand, not to mention that (b) bets both), if we thought that all three strategies were equally likely before we saw any action, seeing two bets should incline us towards calling.

Although Villain seems uncommonly good, there are still more players in the 5/10 NLHE pool who play strategy (c) than those who play (b). Bayes’ Theorem cuts us both ways.

Reading Hero’s Range

Although my pre-flop range is somewhat narrow and well-defined as “too good to fold but not a good candidate for three-betting”, the small bets on the flop and turn mean that I haven’t folded too much of it. Pocket pairs, Kx, AJ, AT, sets, and perhaps some 6x and 7x (though I probably three-bet those pre) all call the flop. The AJ and AT get bluff-raised or ditched on the turn, and sets raise, which means that the pocket pairs and Kx both go to the river. I probably don’t make any flushes or straights on the river.

To make Villain indifferent to bluffing, I’d need to call about half the time. The chance of Villain playing AK or KK this way makes KJ a slightly better bluff-catcher than the pocket pairs, though they really aren’t very different.

I’d much rather have the Js for bluff-catching than the Ks. Some of Villain’s Ks Xs might actually check the turn, so I think the blocking value of Ks is not what it seems.

It’s also possible that this river is so good for Villain’s range that I can’t profitably bluff-catch at all, at least not against this sizing. If his large bet prevents him from balancing with sufficient bluffs, I can exploit him by folding all of my bluff-catchers, which is probably what I should have done. In game, I didn’t appreciate the significance of the small turn bet in terms of potentially limiting Villain’s ability to bluff, especially on this river.

Results

I called. Villain had 98o for a rivered straight, which suggests his pre-flop range was even weaker than I expected.

Seeing that hand makes me like my river call even less, though it also makes me dislike folding pre-flop even more than I already did.

Props to Bryan Gour for considering a raise. I did think about that in game, and I agree that the Ks blocker is perfect for it, but I don’t know that I’d ever raise her for value, so I chose not to do it as a bluff either.

Told Ya So

“This is why I would have raised pre-flop…” To be honest, I was expecting more comments like Zachinacubicle’s than I got.

I’ve already talked about three-betting vs calling pre-flop, and while I’ll admit that as Villain’s pre-flop range gets wider, three-betting gets more appealing, I still prefer calling even knowing that Villain may be raising half the deck. After all, KJo is only a very small favorite against that range, and will not play well out of position. The only reason to three-bet this would be if you expect Villain to fold exploitably often, and that doesn’t seem to be his bag.

It’s important to recognize that this was a really bad river, perhaps the worst in the deck, and Hero still ended up with a close decision. Not all run outs will be this bad, and considering that even a bet on this worst case scenario river produced a close-to-break-even spot for the Hero suggests that this hand is really not so hard to play out of position.

If you are in the “Bah, I don’t care about game theory, people are so easy to exploit!” camp, that’s a fine attitude when it comes to calling or folding the river, at least if you think you have a handle on how Villain can be exploited. But if you’re folding pre-flop because you fear post-flop decisions, then learning to defend your equity by checking and calling in an unexploitable way is valuable for you. Calling and then bluff-catching in a balanced way is simply more profitable than folding pre-flop (and than three-betting pre-flop, unless Villain folds too often).

Contrary to Greg’s assertion, you don’t have to “guess” at Villain’s bluffing frequency. You simply have to call often enough that his bluffing frequency doesn’t matter.

Brian has a slightly different criticism of the call: “You play a limited number of hands live and recreational players make enormous mistakes with deep stacks. Setting up dynamics with almost zero EV vs the best players is a waste of your most precious resource – time playing against the recreational players.”

There’s something to this, but I think the argument cuts both ways. By passing on a profitable call here, you are giving your chief nemesis an opportunity to play against the recreational player, and in fact a very profitable opportunity to exploit that player. Not to mention that calling does still give you a chance to see a flop against that player. This is actually a concept that Nate and I discuss in our WSOP Premium Podcasts.

Edit: I meant to add that it’s quite easy to construct scenarios in three-bet pots that will make you wish you called, much as this particular scenario might make you wish you three-bet. Example: you three-bet pre-flop and get this flop. You either bet and get called, or check and call. On the turn you check and call. You’re in at least as bad of a spot now as I was in this hand, and you’ve put a good deal more money into the pot even before you contemplate calling a river bet.