Analyzing Heads Up Play From the 2013 WSOP Main Event

My latest poker strategy, Analyzing Heads-Up Play From the 2013 WSOP Main Event Final Table, is now appearing in the December edition of 2+2 Magazine. It specifically focuses on the perils of what I call a “weak pot control” strategy where the pre-flop raiser attempts to check back all of his medium-strength hands on the flop and bet only very strong hands and bluffs:

The central problem with this strategy is that it requires your out-of-position opponent to cooperate by allowing you to check your weak hand all the way to showdown when it’s good. Aggressive players aren’t going to make life so easy for you.

Consequently, you must make a decision when you flop a weak but possibly best hand. Can you check hoping to catch bluffs and/or improve, or should you bet, functionally turning it into a bluff since weaker hands than yours aren’t likely to call? Since you can’t count on a good opponent simply checking down all the way with you, there’s no sense in checking the flop unless you’re prepared to call a bet on many turns. This is true even if you think your opponent won’t fold hands better than yours, because there is value in folding out hands that would successfully bluff you on the turn given the opportunity.

Though Jay Farber sometimes employed this strategy, he fared much better when his range for playing aggressively was less polarized. Eventual champion Ryan Riess made several expensive call-downs with weak hands, presumably on the assumption that Farber would be more polarized than he was. My article examines eight hands from their match where this dynamic proved to be a relevant factor.

As always, I’d love to know what you think of the article! What was your impression of the play at the final table, overall?