Edit: As usual, my attempts to perform a complicated equity calculation in under an hour resulted in a mistake. I don’t have time to fix it at the moment – the Borgata Main Event starts shortly – but any calc involving UTG+2 is wrong because his actual calling range is KK+, since I have him shoving AK and QQ pre-flop. I’ll fix this when I have the chance.
Thanks for all the comments on What’s Your Play? Jacks With Heavy Action in Front. This is going to be a little less thorough than usual because I’m posting in between sessions at the Borgata, but I’ll make two general statements with regard to the comments received. The first is that a lot of people ask good questions about how these guys have played in previous hands. The answers would indeed provide helpful context in interpreting these stats, and while I don’t have them, it’s good that you’re thinking about them. The second is that this is both a hand reading and a math problem. If your response didn’t include a discussion of ranges and a calculation of equity, then you’re doing it wrong.
The way I’d think through this is first to decide what my play would be if I had 100% confidence in the stats I gave for these players. As many of you point out, $5 MTT players don’t tend to be this tight, so there’s reason to doubt them. If it turns out that even against tight players we have a shove, then our work is done. Otherwise, we can figure out how close it is and decide how much of a margin of error we want to allow for in the stats.
Sorry for the cyberlingo, by the way. For those who don’t know, VPIP = Voluntarily Put Money in Pot, a measure of how many hands a player plays. PFR = Pre-Flop Raise, a measure of how often the player raises pre-flop.
The UTG raiser has an 8% overall PFR, which means he’s probably tighter than that UTG. Let’s give him {88+,AJs+,KQs,AQo+}
UTG+2’s play is the strangest, as he’s cold calling an UTG raise for a large percentage of his stack. This should be a monster hand, but as Prabhat points out it could easily be something weaker than he doesn’t feel comfortable getting in pre. I’m going to assume he jams strong but vulnerable hands like AQ/AK and TT – QQ and calls with the biggest pairs and with more marginal hands he doesn’t want to get in pre. This is a rough estimate, but if turns out he sometimes flats QQ and jams KK, that’s not going to make much difference. I’ll give him {KK+,99-77,AQs-AJs,KQs,AQo}.
The player doing the shoving isn’t quite as intrinsically tight as UTG, but he also can’t expect to win without a showdown here. I’ll give him {88+,AQs+,AQo+}.
For the sake of simplicity, I’m going to assume that if we jam, everyone with live cards will get it in with QQ+ or AK and fold everything else. If you disagree, that will change the result dramatically. That’s 3% of hands.
UTG folds roughly have the time. UTG+2 folds roughly 75% 78% of the time. There’s also roughly a 10% chance of one of the other four players yet to act waking up with a hand in that range.
(The following calculations ignore card removal, which is complicated but not insignificant here. )
That means you’ll get it heads up with UTG+3 about 34% 35% of the time (.9 * .5 * .75 .78 to find the odds of everyone else folding). You have 53% equity against his range, and there will be 8605 in the pot, so your EV from that is 1550 1596.
Another 34%35%, you’ll race against UTG and UTG+3, with 28% equity in the main pot of 10945 and 36% in the sidepot of 2654. That’s .34 .35(3064.6 + 955.4) = 1367 1407.
If the action folds back to UTG+2, he’ll call just 11% of the time. The other numbers are the same as in the previous case, so .11(3064.6 + 955.4) = 470 Since I’m assuming UTG+2 shoves AK and QQ the first time around, he calls with just AA and KK, which is 22% of his range. There’s a 45% chance of the action folding around to UTG+2, and if he calls, then there’s the same 10945 in the main pot and 2654 on the side. So .45(.22(.17(10945) + .19(2654))) = 234.
About 4% of the time, you’ll race against UTG+3 and someone who came in cold. Then the main pot is 11545 but the sidepot stays the same. .04(.28(11545) + .36(2654)) = 144. Edit: Actually this is further complicated because the pot will be a touch smaller if it’s the BB or SB who comes in cold. Since this is already a rare scenario and it’s a small difference, I’m not going to bother calculating it.
There’s about a 15% chance that you’ll have to race against two others plus UTG+3. That gives you 26% equity in your side pot of 3981 and 22% equity in the main pot of 13245. These numbers change slightly if it’s someone who hasn’t acted yet who gets in there with you, but not enough to be worth calculating. .15(.26(3981) + .22(13245)) = 592
There’s a 1% chance of getting it in with a cold caller and UTG+ 2. That makes a main pot of 13085 and a sidepot of 3981. .01(.16(13085) + .17(3981)) = 28.
4% of the time, you’ll get it in with a cold caller and UTG. .04(.22(13085) + .26(3981)) = 156.
10% of the time, you’ll get it in with UTG, UTG+2, and UTG+3. .1 (.16(12485) + .17 (3981) = 268
Notice that 35% + 35% + 10% + 4% + 1% + 4% + 10% adds to just 95%. This is due to rounding and the <1% chance that you have to race against three or more players. We’ll want to round our result up a bit to account for this, but I don’t feel like writing out even more equations. So 1596+ 1407 + 234 + +144 + 28 + 156 + 268 = 3833 compared to the 4267 you’d have in your stack if you folded. Even accounting for those missing 2% of cases, this is too close to warrant getting in in a tournament where Hero expects to be a significant favorite against the field. Edit: That’s a money loser even after rounding up, and even if we slightly loosen certain assumptions.
Remember, though, that these calculations assume those statistics are accurate. Although VPIP and PFR converge relatively quickly, meaning that you don’t need a huge sample size to be decently confident about them, we’re dealing with very few hands and have good reason to think, given the average player in a $5 MTT, that they are skewing low and these players aren’t as tight as they seem. So in this case, I’d put the money in but not feel overly excited about it.
Edit: One thing we can learn from my initial error and recalculation is that the strength of UTG+2’s calling range makes a big difference – Hero’s EV dropped by nearly 10% when I adjusted it, turning a close fold into a clear fold if my assumptions are accurate. This makes sense, because if he calls just KK and AA, then you’ve absolutely smashed, and if his initial cold calling range is narrow, he’ll have those hands often. So a lot comes down to just how confident you are putting UTG+2 on a narrow range. As several commenters point out, it probably isn’t a good idea with a small sample size in a $5 tournament, and I’d jam in Andre’s shoes, but if UTG+2 is a known good player, I think this is a fold.
Another thing that will make a big difference to your equity is shoehorning TT or AJ into anyone’s calling range. Once you get to the point where you think you could actually get it in ahead sometimes, this becomes a clear shove. Again, that may be possible in a $5 MTT, but perhaps not against very good players.
This is going to sound very stupid to you, but I’d very much like to hear your thoughts on this one Andrew even though it’s only tangentially related.
I have been a regular in small to mid and occasionally high-stakes MTT’s on Stars. The ranges for open-shoving, reshoving and calling that I was taught (by a very strong and respected HSMTT crusher) are miles wider than the ranges that most regulars consider to be correct. Only recently have I discovered, through many threads and posts like this (about hands I wouldn’t have thought even a second about) how wide this disparity is. Despite what should then be a massive hole in my game, I have continued to have a strong winning record over good samples especially in turbos where this sort of leak should see me be destroyed.
It seems to me then that there may be situations where despite the concept of tournament life, there may be value to taking neutral or even -EV gambles for huge stacks. It seems pretty obvious to me that even if Hero has a skill edge over the field, a 20 BB stack doesn’t give much room to exploit that skill edge; in weak tourneys like this stealing lots of pots and chipping up gradually is tough because players call raises too wide creating spots that will become awkward with the 20 BB stack. In tough tourneys too, a 20 BB stack gives you no “skill advantage” because with that stack, there is limited room to exploit whatever few mistakes people may make.
It’s just my intuition and I don’t know how to research to verify this, but I am pretty confident Andre Coimbra with 12k chips 33% of the time would have a higher ROI from this point than him with 4k chips 100% of the time.
Good question. I started to write a long response, which I soon realized would serve me better as a Mailbag post. So look for that on Thursday. Thanks!
Okay, here’s my question: if YOU can’t get this equity calculation correct in an hour away from the table under no special stress, how on earth can anyone else (like me) expect to get it right at the table, within the normal amount of time that people generally get to act in a tournament? No one gets to tank for an hour.
If it’s possible to make generalizations that are useful from a hand like this, then surely there must be ways to think about ranges and equity that provide more general guidelines—ones which could tip a decision one way or another (given all the other factors at play) but not depend on precise values and detailed multi-step calculations.
Fair question. I’m of the opinion that doing the complicated math away from the table – even, especially, when it’s complicated – gives you a better intuitive feel for how to manage spots like this when they arise at the tables. If you look at the comments, you’ll see that some people use some largely non-mathematical reasoning to conclude that this is a fold and others that it’s a call. I think it’s worth actually working out the math sometimes, and since I planned to do that anyway after Andre showed me the hand, I figured I might as well get some more mileage out of it by posting it on the blog. Hopefully you can learn from my mistakes as well as my wisdom! 🙂
To add to Prabhat…
I think the way you play the main even lets say vs 11$ sunday storm must be different.
In 45000+ T’s I think you need to take some -ev gambles to stay ahead of the blinds…
What does it mean to “stay ahead of the blinds”? How does losing chips, which is what happens when you make -EV plays, help you to do that?
Granted my wording is a little like mumbling in type.
I was thinking of examples like flipping early.
I doubt you would ever do this in the main event.
Or maybe like in a spot where you are 40% to win a hand (and like have a 4x starting stack) but chip wise you need like 45% equity. Like Prabhat example.
And by having chips it seems like to me you can go longer avoiding like 10BB where you jam IDK maybe A7 and run into 88’s (sb/bb)
Anyways I am really looking forward to your response to Prabhat.